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A B S T R A C T
Correctly estimating the conﬁdence we should have in our decisions has traditionally been
viewed as a perceptual judgement based solely on the strength or quality of sensory information.
However, accumulating evidence has demonstrated that the motor system contributes to jud-
gements of perceptual conﬁdence. Here, we manipulated the speed at which participants’ moved
using a behavioural priming task and showed that increasing movement speed above partici-
pants’ baseline measures disrupts their ability to form accurate conﬁdence judgements about
their performance. Speciﬁcally, after being primed to move faster than they would naturally,
participants reported higher conﬁdence in their incorrect decisions than when they moved at
their natural pace. We refer to this ﬁnding as the adamantly wrong eﬀect. The results are con-
sistent with the hypothesis that veridical feedback from the eﬀector used to indicate a decision is
employed to form accurate metacognitive judgements of performance.
1. Introduction
Humans are unique amongst animals in being able to provide explicit reports on the reliability of, or conﬁdence in their decisions.
Previous studies have demonstrated that our conﬁdence in our decisions or opinions plays a key role in group interactions (Bahrami
et al., 2010; Koriat, 2012). Whenever people express an opinion, they are likely to also communicate their conﬁdence in that opinion,
be this explicitly through what they say or implicitly in their movements and facial expressions (Aitchison, Bang, Bahrami, & Latham,
2015). Accurate understanding of conﬁdence has obvious implications for high-risk decision making domains such as ﬁnancial
investment (e.g. Broihanne, Merli, & Roger, 2014), medical diagnosis (e.g. Berner & Graber, 2008), jury verdicts (e.g. Tenney,
MacCoun, Spellman, & Hastie, 2007), and politics (Johnson, 2004).
Theoretical models of perception have proposed that conﬁdence is related to the quality or strength of sensory processing
(Barthelmé & Mamassian, 2010; Kepecs, Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Vickers, 1979; Zylberberg,
Barttfeld, & Sigman, 2012; see Yeung & Summerﬁeld, 2012, for a review) and speak to a domain-speciﬁc formation of conﬁdence
judgements. However, there is increasing evidence that perceptual-decision signals are also seen in neural circuits specialised for
motor actions (Cisek & Kalaska, 2005; Freedman & Assad, 2011; Hernández, Zainos, & Romo, 2002; Romo, Hernández, & Zainos,
2004; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001), suggesting a contribution of the motor system to estimates of conﬁdence, and supporting the idea
of metacognition as a domain-general process. Indeed, it has recently been shown that disruption of the motor system, speciﬁcally the
dorsal premotor cortex, reduces metacognitive ability when performing a perceptual discrimination task (Fleming et al., 2014). In
addition, Allen et al. (2016) report the results of an interoceptive priming manipulation where autonomic arousal modulates sub-
jective conﬁdence on a motion-discrimination task. Thus, it is has been suggested that movement parameters proprioceptive and
interoceptive states may also serve as a useful cue for the inference of conﬁdence in our own decision-making.
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Indeed, previous research has shown that the speed at which a participant makes a forced choice decision is correlated with their
conﬁdence, with faster reaction times associated with more conﬁdent decisions (Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010).
Moreover, subjects are able to infer the subjective conﬁdence of another person simply by the observation of their actions (Patel,
Fleming, & Kilner, 2012), with faster movements rated as more conﬁdent and vice versa. This is reliant on the motor system as
subjects with movement disorders have diﬃculty inferring the conﬁdence of others moving at speeds very diﬀerent from their own
(Macerollo, Bose, Ricciardi, Edwards, & Kilner, 2015), and disrupting activity in the motor system reduces healthy individuals
sensitivity to infer conﬁdence from the kinematics of others (Palmer, Bunday, Davare, & Kilner, 2016).
These ﬁndings suggest that an individual may in part infer their conﬁdence in their decisions from their own movement para-
meters. Here, we tested this hypothesis using a behavioural priming task to alter movement speed, while participants performed a
perceptual contrast discrimination task. We recorded the speed at which the participant made their decisions. After each trial of the
perceptual decision task, we asked the participant to rate their conﬁdence in their performance, and calculated their metacognitive
ability, as a measure of the relationship between their conﬁdence and accuracy.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Forty-eight healthy participants with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were recruited (31 female, 17 male), with a mean age
of 27 (range 18–53, median 24). Forty-four reported being right-handed, four reported being left-handed. The experiment was fully
explained to participants, apart from the aim of the project and the true aim of the priming task, which were not disclosed until
debrieﬁng to prevent bias. The experiment was approved by the University College London Ethics Review Board. Informed written
consent was obtained from all participants and procedures were conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
2.2. Equipment
Participants were seated at a table, 60 cm in front of a Dell laptop computer, and responded using the standard QWERTY key-
board, a marble and three touch-sensitive containers (Fig. 1). Stimulus display and response collection were controlled by MATLAB
7.8.0 (Mathworks Inc., MA, USA) using the Cogent 2000 toolbox (http://vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php).
2.3. Stimuli and procedure
The experiment was carried out at the Institute of Neurology, University College London. All participants were tested individually,
in the presence of the experimenter. Participants completed two blocks of a metacognition task described below (50 trials per block),
followed by a movement speed prime (50 trials), a third block of the metacognition task, a second movement speed prime, and ﬁnally
a fourth block of the metacognition task (Fig. 2a). The ﬁrst block of the metacognition task was used as a practice session and was not
included in the analyses.
2.3.1. Metacognition task
The metacognition task was a perceptual contrast discrimination task used in previous studies (Fleming et al., 2010; Patel et al.,
2012). The stimuli were comprised of two images shown in quick succession on the laptop computer screen. Each image comprised a
circular clock-face with six Gabor gratings (circular patches of light and dark bars) arranged around a central ﬁxation point (Fig. 2b).
The background was uniform grey, with a luminance of 3.66 cd/m2.
In one of the two images, all the Gabor gratings were set to the same contrast, that is, a ‘baseline’ Gabor grating. In the other
image, one of the Gabor gratings was set to a higher contrast than the other ﬁve baseline gratings, causing it to appear as a ‘pop-out’.
Pop-out gratings were drawn from a stimulus set that varied in contrast between 23 and 80% in increments of 3%. The pop-out Gabor
Fig. 1. Experimental setup (photo). Participants moved the marble from the central homepad container to the rightmost container if they believed the pop-out Gabor
was present in the ﬁrst interval, or the leftmost container if they believed the pop-out Gabor was present in the second interval. They then returned the marble to the
homepad container. They were then prompted by the computer to enter the value between one and 99 that represented their relative conﬁdence in their decision using
the numbers of the keyboard of the laptop.
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grating would appear at random in either the ﬁrst or second image and at a random spatial position orientated around a central
ﬁxation point.
After viewing both images, participants were prompted to make a decision as to which image (ﬁrst or second) contained the pop-
out grating by the appearance of the message “1 or 2” on the screen. Participants made their response by moving a marble from the
‘homepad’, positioned centrally on the table, to one of two containers, marked “1” and “2”. The container marked “1” was always
located on the right of the homepad, and “2” on the left. After indicating their decision, participants returned the marble to the
homepad. A red square framed their selection on the screen and participants were then prompted to indicate their conﬁdence in their
decision by typing a number between 1 and 99. A lower value indicated low conﬁdence and a higher value indicated high conﬁdence.
No feedback was given to participants about the actual accuracy of their decision. Reaction times were recorded from participants
while they indicated their decision on the contrast discrimination task, allowing us to operationalise movement speed as the time
between the marble being removed from the homepad and placed in a response container.
The contrast of the pop-out Gabor grating was varied throughout the experiment using a two-up, one-down staircase procedure to
keep accuracy consistent (Fleming et al., 2014; Patel et al., 2012). The staircase operated such that after two consecutive correct
decisions the contrast was decreased by one increment, whereas after one incorrect decision the contrast was increased by one
increment. A correct response would thus be made on approximately 70% of trials, ensuring that the analysis of movement speed and
Fig. 2. Experimental procedure schematics: (a) the experiment included four blocks of the metacognition task (50 trials each) and two blocks of the movement prime
(50 trials each). All participants completed all six elements. (b) Metacognition Task: participants completed a two-alternative forced-choice task that required two
judgements per trial: a perceptual response followed by an estimate of relative conﬁdence in their decision. The perceptual response indicated whether the ﬁrst or
second temporal interval contained the higher-contrast (pop-out) Gabor patch (represented here by a darker circle), which could appear at any one of six locations
around a central ﬁxation point. Pop out Gabor contrast was continually adjusted with the use of a staircase procedure to maintain ∼70% performance. Conﬁdence
ratings were made using a one-to-99 scale, with participants encouraged to use the whole scale from one= low relative conﬁdence to 99= relative high conﬁdence.
The red frame in the rightmost panel indicates the choice made in the metacognitive task. (c) Movement Prime Task: participants were prompted to move the marble
from the homepad to either of two containers marked 1 and 2, by the appearance of the number on the screen. They were then given feedback by the computer on their
movement speed. The slow prime was designed to slow their movement speed, i.e. the time taken for the entire movement (MT) had to be above 300ms. The reaction
time to begin the movement (i.e. remove the marble from the homepad) (RT1) had to be less than 1600ms, to ensure that subjects moved slowly and not merely
responded slowly. The fast prime was designed to increase their movement speed, i.e. under 1500ms. Participants then returned the marble to the homepad container
before proceeding to the next trial.
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conﬁdence was not aﬀected by performance. In addition to movement speed and conﬁdence rating, we also recorded accuracy
(correct or incorrect response) and signal strength (pop-out Gabor grating contrast strength) on each trial.
2.3.2. Movement prime
During this task, participants were prompted to move the marble from the homepad to either of the two containers marked “1”
and “2”, and then return it to the homepad. The desired location was instructed on a trial by trial basis, by the appearance of a 1 or 2
on the screen. On completing the movement, participants were given visual feedback on the screen about their movement speed (“just
right”/“too slow”/“too fast”) (Fig. 2c). Movement speed was calculated from the same reaction time parameters as those used in the
metacognition task. The fast prime was designed to increase movement speed above natural average parameters, while the slow
prime was designed to decrease movement speed below natural parameters.
In the fast prime task, the goal was for participants to remove the marble from the homepad container and move it to the indicated
container as fast as possible. A message of “just right” appeared on the screen if the time it took to complete the task was less than
1500ms. If the time between the marble being removed from the homepad container and being placed in another container was
greater than 1500ms, a message of “two slow” appeared. In the slow prime task, participants were required to complete the
movement of the marble from the homepad container to the indicated container in over 2300ms. If they accomplished this, a
message of “just right” appeared on the screen. If their movement speed was less than 2300ms, a message of “too fast” was presented.
To prevent participants simply delaying the onset of the movement, a message of “start time too slow” was presented if the parti-
cipant did not remove the marble from the homepad container in under 1600ms. The order in which participants completed the
movement prime task (fast or slow ﬁrst) was counterbalanced.
2.4. Analyses
As the ﬁrst block of the metacognition task was used as a practice session, the analyses presented here were conducted on blocks
two through four. All trials with a recorded movement time of zero were removed from analyses. Greenhouse-Geisser was used to
correct for violated sphericity and a more stringent alpha criterion of p= .01 was used to correct for multiple comparisons, where
required.
2.4.1. Analysis 1: Relationship between movement speed and conﬁdence
We conducted a bivariate correlation analysis of conﬁdence and movement speed at baseline (second block of the metacognition
task). Movement speeds and conﬁdence ratings were mean-corrected and then ranked by movement speed from fastest to slowest.
These values were then divided into ten equal sized bins in order of increasing magnitude. Each bin was then averaged to produce ten
mean values for conﬁdence and ten mean values for movement speed. A signiﬁcant negative relationship would replicate previous
ﬁndings of an inverse interdependence (Baranski & Petrusic, 1998; Fleming et al., 2010; Patel et al., 2012), whereby higher con-
ﬁdence is associated with faster movement.
2.4.2. Analysis 2: Eﬀect of movement prime on movement speed
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine if the movement primes had worked. That is, was there was a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of movement prime on movement time, in the expected direction. In other words, had the fast prime made participants move
faster and had the slow prime made participants move slower?
2.4.3. Analysis 3: Eﬀect of movement prime on conﬁdence
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine if the movement primes had produced a signiﬁcant eﬀect on conﬁdence
ratings.
2.4.4. Analysis 4: Eﬀect of movement prime on metacognitive accuracy
Firstly, we used a non-parametric measure of metacognitive sensitivity that characterised the probability of being correct for a
given level of conﬁdence (Fleming et al., 2010; Patel et al., 2012). Receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curves were produced for
participants’ conﬁdence ratings and accuracy. First, conﬁdence ratings were ranked from lowest to highest and organised into seven
bins. Subsequently, hi= p(conﬁdence= I | correct) and ﬁ=p(conﬁdence= I | incorrect) was calculated for each bin, I, whereby
“hi” indicates a correct perceptual response (i.e. hit) and “ﬁ” indicates an incorrect response (i.e. false alarm). These probabilities
were then transformed into cumulative probabilities and plotted against each other to produce the ROC curve. The area underlying
the ROC curve (AROC) was calculated by the sum of the area between the ROC curve and the area underlying the area of the half-
square triangle below the major diagonal:
∑= − − − +
=
+ +A h f h f0.25 [( ) ( ) ] 0.5
k







Thus, the area below the major diagonal in an individual’s ROC curve is a measure of their ability to link conﬁdence to perceptual
performance (AROC), in other words, their metacognitive accuracy. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine if the
movement primes had produced a signiﬁcant eﬀect on metacognitive accuracy.
Secondly, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and nonparametric permutation were used to determine if there was an interaction eﬀect
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between correct and incorrect responses and movement primes on conﬁdence.
3. Results
3.1. Analysis 1: Relationship between movement speed and conﬁdence
A bivariate correlation analysis revealed a signiﬁcant negative correlation between conﬁdence and movement speed
[r2=−0.870, p= .001, df= 47], before the application of any movement prime tasks (Fig. 3). This replicates previous ﬁndings of a
negative relationship between conﬁdence and movement speed (Baranski & Petrusic, 1998; Fleming et al., 2010; Patel et al., 2012).
3.2. Analysis 2: Eﬀect of movement prime on movement speed
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA with three levels (baseline, fast, slow) revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of condition on
movement speed [F(1.62,76.11)= 8.720, p= .001, ηp2= 0.156].
Pairwise comparisons revealed signiﬁcantly faster movement speeds after the fast prime (mean= 706.394, SD=145.070)
compared to baseline measures (mean= 745.460, SD=165.241) [t(47)= 3.161, p= .002, d=0.469] and slower movement speeds
after the slow prime (mean= 776.829, SD=203.351) compared to after the fast prime [t(47)= 3.948, p < .001, d=0.638]
(Fig. 4a). The diﬀerence in movement speed after the slow prime relative to baseline measures was not signiﬁcant [t(47)= 1.597,
p= .117, d=−0.239]. The diﬀerence between movement speeds post fast prime and post slow prime was conﬁrmed to be sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent with a nonparametric sign test (p < .001). One large outlying data-point (> 500ms) can be seen in the Slow
condition (Fig. 4a). Removing this participant’s data from the analysis revealed the same result, with a main eﬀect of condition [F
(2,92)= 13.542, p < .001, ηp2= 0.227], driven by signiﬁcant diﬀerences between baseline and fast conditions [p= .007] and fast
and slow conditions [p < .001].
3.3. Analysis 3: Eﬀect of movement prime on conﬁdence
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA with three levels (baseline, fast, slow) revealed no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of condition on
conﬁdence [F(1.79,84.32)= 0.070, p= .916, ηp2= 0.001] (Fig. 4b). One large outlying data-point (> 15) can be seen in the Slow
condition (Fig. 4b). Removing this participant’s data from the analysis revealed the same result, with no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
condition [F(1,46)= 0.057, p= .812, ηp2= 0.001].
Fig. 3. Average ranked mean-corrected conﬁdence ratings over trials for each subject (n= 48) plotted against average mean-corrected movement time, given in
milliseconds. Bivariate correlation analysis revealed a signiﬁcant negative correlation (r2=−0.870, p= .001). Error bars reﬂect the standard error of the mean.
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3.4. Analysis 4: Eﬀect of movement prime on metacognitive accuracy
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA with three levels (baseline, fast, slow) revealed no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of condition on [F
(1.56,73.50)= 2.389, p= .111, ηp2= 0.048] on AROC. Speciﬁcally looking at the diﬀerence in metacognitive accuracy between the
two primed conditions revealed signiﬁcantly higher AROC after the slow prime (mean=0.756, SD=0.080) than after the fast prime
(mean=0.725, SD=0.089) [t(47)= 2.659, p= .011, d=0.385) (Fig. 4c). Neither of these values was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to
baseline (mean=0.747, SD=0.105) (Baseline vs Slow [t(47)= 0.534, p= .596, d=−0.077], Baseline vs Fast [t(47)= 1.611,
p= .114, d=0.239]). One large outlying data-point (> 0.2) can be seen in the Slow condition (Fig. 4c). Removing this participant’s
data from the analysis revealed the same result, with no main eﬀect of condition [F(1.637,75.298)= 2.296, p= .117, ηp2= 0.048,
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected].
As AROC has previously been found to be inﬂuenced by both Type-I accuracy/d′ and criterion (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Fleming &
Lau, 2014), Spearman’s correlation analyses were conducted to conﬁrm that changes observed in AROC were not the result of con-
ditional changes in these measures. There was no signiﬁcant correlation between AROC and d′ [rs= 0.175, p= .234] or AROC and
criterion [rs=−0.077, p= .602] after the fast prime or between AROC and d′ [rs=−0.123, p= .407] or between AROC and cri-
terion [rs= 0.189. p= .199] after the slow prime (see Supplementary Fig. 1). (See also Supplementary Fig. 2 for subject wise Type-II
ROC curves for each condition).
As we had found a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in metacognitive accuracy between the primed conditions in the absence of signiﬁcant
changes in conﬁdence, we investigated whether changes in conﬁdence were dependent on participant’s accuracy. To this end, a two-
way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with a factor of response (2 levels, correct or incorrect) and a factor of condition (3
levels: baseline, fast prime, slow prime) was performed. This revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of response, with signiﬁcantly higher
conﬁdence on correct trials than incorrect trials [F(1,47)= 169.559, p < .001, ηp2= 0.783]. There was no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
condition [F(1,47)= 0.823, p= .369, ηp2= 0.005]. There was a signiﬁcant interaction between the two [F(1.99, 93.66)= 5.487,
p= .006, ηp2= 0.188].
To investigate the location of the interaction eﬀect, we removed the main eﬀect of response by mean-correcting the conﬁdence
data. Conﬁdence ratings for correct and incorrect responses were mean-corrected separately. As a result, the main eﬀect of response
was no longer signiﬁcant [F(1,47)= 0.823, p= .269, ηp2= 0.021] but the results of the main eﬀect of condition and interaction
eﬀect remained identical [F(1,47)= 0.823, p= .369; F(1.99,93.66)= 5.487, p= .006, ηp2= 0.188, respectively]. Pairwise com-
parisons revealed signiﬁcantly higher conﬁdence for incorrect responses (mean= 1.519, SD=5.068) than correct responses
(mean=−1.523, SD=4.455) after a fast prime [p= .002, d=0.469] (Fig. 5). All other comparisons were insigniﬁcant after
correcting for multiple comparisons.
Furthermore, we tested whether this interaction eﬀect was also signiﬁcant using non-parametric analysis. To this end, we ran a
permutation test on the interaction. We simulated 10,000 permutations to determine the distribution of values for the interaction of
interest. In each simulation, the average conﬁdence ratings for each of the four conditions were randomly assigned to the four
conditions: Fast Prime correct, Slow Prime incorrect, Fast Prime Incorrect, Slow Prime correct. This was performed for each parti-
cipant independently. The average interaction value was then calculated across participants as above. Once this had been repeated
10,000 times, the distribution of the interaction terms could be plotted, and the point of the true interaction value on this distribution
was calculated. This test also revealed a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect (less than 0.1% of the data had permutations at a higher value
than the true value, i.e. p < .001). In other words, this interaction eﬀect occurred by chance in less than 0.1% of circumstances,
indicating this to be a robust eﬀect.
Fig. 4. Average mean-corrected movement time (panel a), conﬁdence (panel b) and metacognitive accuracy (panel c) for all subjects (n= 48) at baseline, and after
fast and slow primes (*p < .05, two-tailed). A signiﬁcant decrease in movement time was observed after the fast prime, and signiﬁcant increase after the slow prime. A
signiﬁcant increase in metacognitive accuracy was observed after the slow prime. Error bars reﬂect the standard error of the mean.
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4. Discussion
Here we tested the hypothesis that altering participants’ movement speed will disrupt their ability to form accurate conﬁdence
judgements of their performance. The results supported this hypothesis by indicating that after being primed to move faster than they
would naturally, participants report higher conﬁdence in their incorrect decisions than their correct ones. Overall, metacognitive
accuracy was signiﬁcantly higher when participants were slowed than when they were quickened. These ﬁndings suggest that the
metacogntive ability to match conﬁdence to accuracy relies on a veridical signal from the motor system.
These data are consistent with previous ﬁndings on the role of the motor system in judgements of perceptual conﬁdence. We
replicated the ﬁnding that the speed at which an individual makes a forced choice decision is correlated with their conﬁdence, with
faster reaction times associated with more conﬁdent decisions (Fleming et al., 2010). Consistent with the ﬁnding that disrupting
activity in the motor system reduces an individual’s ability to form accurate judgements of conﬁdence (Fleming et al., 2014) and to
infer conﬁdence from the kinematics of others (Palmer et al., 2016), here we ﬁnd that altering an individual’s kinematics beha-
viourally reduces their ability to infer their own conﬁdence.
The absence of a signiﬁcant direct eﬀect of movement time on conﬁdence in the presence of a relationship between conﬁdence,
accuracy and movement, suggests that the relationship between metacognition and movement is not a simple linear one. In this
study, moving faster does not increase conﬁdence and moving slower does not decrease conﬁdence directly. However, moving faster
when you are incorrect raises your conﬁdence above and beyond what it is following a correct response. It is important to note that
feedback on performance was not provided to participants in the research reported here. Thus, the only information participants had
to use in their judgement about their conﬁdence was the decision making process itself, including the movement made to indicate
their response. It is possible that if participants possess an internal model of their decision making, including the movement made to
indicate that decision, modifying movement parameters may disrupt the learnt relationship between how movement time relates to
conﬁdence. In eﬀect, participants are no longer able to successfully ‘read out’ their conﬁdence from their movement time. As a result,
their metacognitive ability can no longer be predicted.
The results presented here point towards a role of kinematics in higher-order cognitive functions, such as the metacognitive
monitoring of performance. Previous research had shown that cognition has a top-down inﬂuence on an individual’s motor beha-
viour, i.e. that we move faster when we’re feeling more conﬁdent (Audley, 1960; Baranski & Petrusic, 1998; Henmon, 1911; Johnson,
1939; Patel et al., 2012; Volkmann, 1934), but the results of the current research also suggests that we may need an accurate and
veridical representation of our motor behaviour in order to form accurate and veridical cognitive judgements. This supports a more
‘closed-loop’ view of action and cognition, whereby there are bottom-up inﬂuences on cognition from the body, in addition to the
more closely studied top-down cogntive inﬂuences on behaviour. As such, the present ﬁndings hold implications for traditional views
of cognition, as operating on a distinct plane from the motor system.
While the results of the current research do suggest a trial by trial correspondence between conﬁdence and accuracy that is
inﬂuenced by ascending information from the eﬀector about the movement speed used to indicate the decision, the present design
does not allow us to comment on whether continued processing of this information takes place. According to decision-locus models of
metacognition conﬁdence is solely based on evidence available at the point of the judgement (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Vickers, 1979).
Alternatively, according to postdecisional-locus models, metacognitive evidence continues to be accumulated after the decision has
been made (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). Evidence from transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) indicated that stimulation applied
after the decision aﬀected conﬁdence judgements and does support the latter hypothesis (Fleming et al., 2014). The time course of
Fig. 5. Panel A: Average mean-corrected conﬁdence for all subjects at baseline, and after the fast and slow primes. Conﬁdence on incorrect and correct trials were
mean-corrected separately and are thus plotted separately. After the fast prime, participants reported signiﬁcantly higher conﬁdence on incorrect trials than correct
trials (p= .002, two-tailed, Bonferroni-corrected). Panel B shows the interaction term for (incorrect responses after a fast prime – incorrect responses after a slow
prime – correct responses after a fast prime – correct responses after a fast prime). Panel C shows the diﬀerence between correct and incorrect responses for the fast
prime.
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this eﬀect, however, is not known. Further research might investigate for what length of time after movement modulation meta-
cognitive disruption is seen.
In this study we demonstrated a causal role of the motor system in metacognition, speciﬁcally, that how an individual moves
when they make a decision impacts their ability to relate their feelings of conﬁdence to their performance. This ﬁnding suggests that
humans obtain information about their conﬁdence levels by monitoring their movement kinematics and that these inferences can be
manipulated by changing how subjects move. It would be interesting for future research to investigate the role that organic changes
in movement speed, such as that seen in Parkinson’s disease, play in metacognitive ability and estimates of subjective states, such as
conﬁdence. This research suggests that highlights the need for researchers should to consider the inclusion of kinematic information
in subsequent models of metacognition. One such model is presented by Fleming and Daw (2017), which accounts for action in self-
evaluation judgements proposes that individuals form conﬁdence estimates by applying an analogous computation to their own
actions.
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